Why a secure computer system in an Inspector General’s office is essential
And not just in the New Orleans IG office …
While conducting NolaStat research on the CapStat experience in D.C., I found this Washington Post story detailing how the District of Columbia technology security chief, Yusef Acar, was indicted earlier this year in a kickback scheme that netted hundreds of thousands of dollars in illicit gains:
A D.C. government official and a business executive were arrested yesterday on bribery charges involving city technology contracts that included “ghost” workers and kickbacks, federal authorities said. …
Yusuf Acar, 40, who has worked in the technology office since 2004, was charged with bribery, conspiracy, money laundering and conflict of interest.
Especially shocking was how Acar actually set up an automated program to intercept emails from the Inspector General’s office so that he could alert himself to any monitoring of his illicit activities:
Acar had tapped into District e-mail systems and was intercepting e-mail traffic to and from the Office of the Inspector General in order to monitor whether they had gotten wind of his schemes.
There continues to be unfortunate chatter about former Inspector General Robert Cerasoli’s term, and his purchase of expensive computer equipment to create a secure system. The D.C. example demonstrates that Robert Cerasoli certainly knew what he was doing. The sitting Inspector General should proceed with Cerasoli’s plans to create a computer network secure from unauthorized monitoring.
